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"The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between 
liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger 
that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a 
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of 
Rights into a suicide pact." 
Justice Robert H. Jackson1 
There are many ways of reading the past. The most com-
mon and popular is a focus on the subject itself, a narrative of 
the events with a little analysis mixed in. A second is the schol-
arly discourse, the author entering into a conversation with his 
or her predecessors in the profession. And then there is the per-
sonal search by the individual author for meaning in the past, a 
format favored by those interested in identity history and poli-
tics, and, all too often, by iegal scholars. This third tack is using 
history in the service of some current position; what Bernard 
Bailyn called "the twin sins of anachronism and presentism."2 
The first two approaches pursue "history" as a professional re-
sponsibility, the third as a policy struggle with only one possibly 
correct position. 
Laura Kalman's recent book, The Strange Career of Legal 
Liberalism,3 offers an outstanding dissection of this division in 
scholarly approaches. Legal scholars, she quotes Frank Michel-
man as stating, "min[e]" the past and "make a case" for a spe-
cific, pre-exiting perspective. Such writers ransack the past, 
• Professor of History, Emory University. 
1. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
2. Quoted in Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laugluer and Forgetting: Kal-
man's "Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 Harv. L Rev. 
1025, 1027 (1998). 
3. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale U. Press, 1996). 
4. ld. at 175. 
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seeking supportive arguments and quotations to promote and 
enhance their case for the present. Like big game hunters they 
return from their safari with their prized quotes, having paid no 
attention to the wider environment or social context of their tro-
phies. They rarely descend into a period to get a sense of the 
nuances and complexities; and they certainly never bother to 
count, to arrive at the aggregate rather than the exceptional. As 
Morton Horwitz put it, this "lawyer's history ... involves roam-
ing through history looking for one's friends."5 
Good historians do not attempt to use the past to craft a 
correct formula for current conduct (a classic misreading of 
George Santayana). They do not seek a pedigree, as Kalman 
put it. 6 Lawyers, who "appropriated historians for advocacy 
purposes,"7 have not hesitated to seize upon republicanism, the 
supposed ideology of the nation's founding, as a useful paradigm 
with an imagined applicability to present circumstances. But the 
present does not exist to provide precedent for some future soci-
ety. It seems so obvious, yet somehow still needs stating when-
ever lawyers write legal history. 
There are of course many notable exceptions. Andrew 
Kull's Color Blind Constitution8 leaps to mind as a work of solid 
historical scholarship which follows the evidence wherever it 
may lead, and which is authentically concerned to get the con-
text of legal developments just right. Nonetheless, far too many 
legal scholars, most especially on issues revolving around the 
Second Amendment, seem not to understand why one would 
bother but to argue some imagined client's cause; nor can they 
conceive what possible use history is if it does not provide usable 
authority. A historian like William Leuchtenburg who finds and 
uses evidence contrary to an initially held position may be in-
comprehensible to many legal scholars.9 "Leuchtenburg's com-
pliment is the lawyer's insult," Kalman writes. "It is [the] law-
yers' business to build paradigms. Too much orderliness, 
however, makes historians suspicious. "10 As Edmund Morgan 
wrote Felix Frankfurter, the historian rejects "the demand for 
5. Id. at 179 (quoting Morton Horwitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism, in 
Paul Finkleman and Stephen Gottlieb, eds., Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State 
Constitutions 148 (U. of Georgia Press, 1991)). 
6. Kalman, Strange Career at 180 (cited in note 3). 
7. Id. at 185. 
8. Andrew Kull, The Color Blind Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1992). 
9. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Historian in the Public Realm, 97 Am. Hist. Rev. 
11 (1992) 
10. Kalman, Strange Career at 186 (cited in note 3). 
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symmetry," avoiding sharp dichotomies which misrepresent the 
past.11 Put another way, professional historians immediately 
doubt any case for which all the evidence falls consistently on 
one side. 
Historians know that history is full of ambiguities and para-
doxes, and expect to find them. That explains why most histori-
ans of early America shrugged their shoulders in bemusement 
over the Second Amendment debates and said little, until re-
cently. Only when one side in that polemic proclaimed itself the 
winner, and even went so far as to declare itself "the new con-
sensus" and "the standard model,"12 did many historians come 
forth to question this monopoly on truth. 13 
Kalman notes that lawyers turned to republicanism as a to-
tal and all-inclusive explanation of early American history at 
precisely the moment that American historians were abandoning 
the concept.14 Similarly, as Saul Cornell points out with great 
acuity, proponents of an insurrectionist reading of the Second 
Amendment have insisted that they have a "standard model" for 
reading the Constitution and early American intellectual and 
cultural life at the same time that the vast majority of historians 
have rejected the idea that any aspect of American history can 
be understood "in terms of a single ideological paradigm."15 
11. ld. 
12. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 461 (1995). This issue of the Tennessee Law Review offers a complete, unquali· 
fied, and uncritical overview of the "standard model," or "individualist" reading of the 
Second Amendment. For claims that there is a "new consensus" and "virtual unanimity, 
that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual right 
view of the Second Amendment," see Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: 
The New Consensus on the Second Amendmem, 45 Emory L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996). 
13. Recent works examining the historical context include Lawrence D. Cress, An 
Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. of Am. 
Hist. 22 (1984) (examines the intellectual context of the Second Amendment); Carl T. 
Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311 (1998) 
(looks at fears of slave insurrection among the Southern elite); Don Higginbotham, The 
Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 
Wm. & Mary Q. 39 (1998) (studies the first federal efforts to establish a "well regulated 
militia"); as well as two articles I have written looking at patterns of gun ownership and 
the nature of gun laws in early America: The Origins of American Gun Culture in the 
United States, 1760-1865,83 J. of Am. Hist. 425 (1996); Gun Laws in Early America: The 
Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 567 (1998). The two 
leading historical works for the Standard Modelers are Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and 
Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Harvard U. Press, 1994) and Rob-
ert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. of Am. Hist. 
599 (1982). 
14. Kalman, Strange Career at 176-80 (cited in note 3). 
15. Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second 
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 
Const. Comm. 221 (1999). 
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Almost no historian speaks any more of a uniform, cohesive 
American culture; there are too many strands to the fabric of 
early American society to maintain that just one speaks for all. 
But then that was exactly the point of federalism, and precisely 
the perspective offered by James Madison in the Federalist Pa-
pers.16 So we now have the delicious irony of conservative legal 
scholars rejecting the vision of James Madison as inaccurate, and 
embracing the classic liberal ideal of a unifying American con-
sensus.17 
Adherents of the Standard Model find in the Second 
Amendment a right to insurrection. The people retain the indi-
vidual right to bear arms as an implicit threat to revolution. In 
good times, that threat keeps the government in line; in bad, 
when the government oversteps its bounds, the people may rise 
up and overthrow that government. The position was most 
clearly stated in the context of the recent bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma, when Linda Thompson, declar-
ing herself the Adjutant General of the Unorganized Militia of 
the United States, explained that the Second Amendment "isn't 
about hunting ducks; it's about hunting politicians. "18 The most 
obvious question which adherents of the Standard Model must 
answer is: who gets to decide? Who chooses when it is time for 
"the people" to use their arms against the government? Does 
Linda Thompson get to choose? Timothy McVeigh? 
The very questions point up the weakness of the position; 
the Standard Model is an abstraction divorced from a specific 
historical context. At times it borders on an intellectual game 
played by law professors swapping quotations and citing one an-
other. As one reads yet again Justice Story's description of the 
militia as the "palladium of liberty," one realizes that the Stan-
dard Modellers are just shuffling the same deck and dealing it 
out in a different order. 
Let us stop for a moment and examine that now famous 
quotation of Justice Story's, the only ante-bellum evidence for 
16. To state the obvious, Federalist 10 (Madison) in Ointon Rossiter, ed., The Fed-
eralist Papers 77 (Mentor, 1961); but see Federalist 6 (Hamilton), id. at 53; Federalist 9 
(Hamilton), id. at 71; Federalist 15 (Hamilton), id. at 105; Federalist 70 (Hamilton), id. at 
423; Federalist 39 (Madison), id. at 240; Federalist 51 (Madison), id. at 320. See also Jack 
N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 161-
202 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 
17. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American 
Political Thought Since the Revolution (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955). 
18. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: 
Conjuring with the People, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 879,894 (1996). 
1999] SUICIDE PACT 251 
the supposed right to insurrection imbedded in the Second 
Amendment offered by Sanford Levinson in his landmark arti-
cle, The Embarrassing Second Amendment. 19 For those of you 
who have somehow managed to miss it, Joseph Story wrote in 
his Commentaries: 
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been 
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since 
it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbi-
trary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are suc-
cessful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and tri-
zo 
umph over them. 
No one claims that this single quotation proves an individ-
ual right to bear arms, most particularly because Justice Story 
was not present at the creation and also frames his discussion of 
the Second Amendment in terms of the militia, and because the 
next two sentences, rarely quoted, seemingly deny such an indi-
vidual right.21 Yet it is a foundational citation for the Standard 
Modelers, standing in for the absence of any direct evidence 
from the framers themselves. For an historian the core question 
is how reflective this single sentence is of the thought of Joseph 
Story. The militia appears a minor issue in Story's life; in fact 
there is no reference to it in the collection of his work he pre-
pared,22 nor in that prepared by his son,23 nor in his collected let-
ters,24 nor in any of the standard biographies of Story.25 
19. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 
649-50 (1989). Levinson also cited Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitu-
tional Law in the United States of America 298 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1898), and the early 
twentieth century lawyer, Theodore Schroeder, Free Speech for Radicals 104 (Burt 
Franklin, 1969). 
20. Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a 
Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States Before the 
Adoption of the Constitution 620 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1873). 
21. "And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well-
regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised that, among the 
American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a 
strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is prac-
ticable to keep the people duly armed without some organization it is difficult to see." 
ld at 620-21. 
22. Joseph Story, The Miscellaneous Writings, Literary, Critical, Juridical, and Po-
litical (James Munroe and Co., 1835). 
23. William W. Story, ed., The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Charles C. 
Little and James Brown, 1852). 
24. William W. Story, ed., Life and Leuers of Joseph Story (Charles C. Little and 
James Brown, 1851). 
25. R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Coun Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old 
Republic (U. of North Carolina Press, 1985); Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and 
the Rise of the Supreme Court (Simon and Schuster, 1970); James McClellan, Joseph 
Story and the American Constitution: A Study in Political and Legal Thought (U. of 
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Story, who never served in the militia, did, however, have an 
opinion about the right to insurrection: he denied it, actively op-
posing any which occurred in his lifetime. Justice Story is seen 
by most commentators as a conservative figure.26 He considered 
himself a disciple of Burke and held up Metternich as a role 
model to his students.27 He warned these same Harvard students 
against the abolitionists-anarchists bent on overturning the 
constitutional order-and viewed with horror the contemporary 
"restless spirit of innovation and change-a fretful desire to pro-
voke discussions of all sorts, under the pretext of free inquiry, or 
of comprehensive liberalism. "28 Story proclaimed Dorr's non-
violent rebellion to establish universal manhood suffrage "with-
out law and against law,"29 maintained that "the Legislature have 
a right to call upon the President to protect the government 
against 'domestic violence,' under the Constitution of the United 
States,"30 and requested President Tyler to warn "all persons not 
to attempt to carry any measures into effect by military power, 
or by insurrectionary movements. "31 Story proclaimed insurrec-
tion treason, clarifying that treason included any action "to pre-
vent the execution of any one or more general and public laws of 
the government, or to resist the exercise of any legitimate 
authority. "32 
In short, Story held the opposite of what the Standard Mod-
elers read into a single quotation. Faced with insurrection, Story 
wrote "I know no duty more sacred in every citizen than upon 
such an emergency to come forth and resist by all the just and 
moral means in his power, such proceedings."33 For Story the 
American Revolution put an end to the need for any more re-
Oklahoma Press, 1971). 
26. The entire thrust of McOellan, Joseph Story (cited in note 25). See also New-
myer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story at 84-88, 94-97, 155-81, 269-70, 313, 390-91 
(cited in note 25). 
27. Story, ed., Miscellaneous Writings at 761, 777 (cited in note 23); Newmyer, Su-
preme Court Justice Joseph Story at 356 (cited in note 25); Dunne, Justice Joseph Story at 
338 (cited in note 25); McOellan, Joseph Story at 79-81 (cited in note 25). 
28. Story, ed., Miscellaneous Writings at 747 (cited in note 23); Newmyer, Supreme 
Coun Justice Joseph Story at 357 (cited in note 25). 
29. Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story at 360 (cited in note 25) (quoting 
Letter from Story to Webster, April 26, 1842, Webster Papers (New Hampshire Historical 
Society)). 
30. Letter from Story to Judge Pitman (April1, 1842), in Story, ed., 2 Life and Let-
ters at 419 (cited in note 24). 
31. Newmyer, Supreme Coun Justice Joseph Story at 361 (cited in note 25) (quoting 
Letter from Story to Daniel Webster). 
32. Id at 362; Story, ed., 2 Life and Letters at 516 (cited in note 24). 
33. Letter from Story to Judge Pitman (Feb. 10, 1842), in Story, ed., 2 life and Let-
ters at 416 (cited in note 24). 
1999] SUICIDE PACT 253 
hellions or uprisings; the country was now stable and secure, and 
the people should remain orderly. To read the sources other-
wise is to practice a twisted form of post-modernism. Or as Jus-
tice Story also wrote, "It is astonishing how easily men satisfy 
themselves that the Constitution is exactly what they wish it to 
be."34 
But there is more to history than parsing the language of the 
Second Amendment and a few shared quotations. As I hope I 
demonstrated above, and as Saul Cornell compellingly insists, 
for historians of any subject it is vital that "the behavior of the 
historical actors who wrote these texts must be read alongside 
their published statements. "35 It matters at least as much what 
those who framed and endorsed the Second Amendment actu-
ally did; to examine what legislation preceded and followed the 
Bill of Rights in order to understand how the framers intended 
to use it; to trace their patterns of enforcement once in office. It 
matters that every state in the union had gun regulations in place 
at the time of the Second Amendment's passage, and that more 
followed afterward. 36 It matters that those who passed federal 
militia regulation over the next several decades saw themselves 
responding to constitutional mandate. 37 It also mattered, as I 
think Cornell's article makes clear, that those who supported the 
Second Amendment had no problem disarming rebels and using 
the power of the state and federal governments to put down any 
and all insurrections. 
Cornell correctly draws our attention to the example of 
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provides 
another key quotation for the Standard Modelers, as Cornell 
notes: "The people have a ri§ht to bear arms for the defense [of] 
themselves and the State." 8 Yet that provision apparently 
granting an individual right to bear arms did not preclude the 
same legislature from passing the Test Act, which included the 
disarming of those who would not take the oath of allegiance. 
34. Letter from Story to Simon Greenleaf (Feb. 16, 1845), in Story, ed., 2 Life and 
Letters at 514 (cited in note 24). 
35. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 225 (cited in note 15). 
36. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America at 587 (cited in note 13). 
37. Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate (cited in note 13); Lyle D. Brun-
dage, The Organization, Administration, and Training of the United States Ordinary and 
Volunteer Militia, 1792-1861 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958); Martin 
K. Gordon, The Militia of the District of Columbia, 1790-1815 (Ph.D. dissertation, 
George Washington University, 1975); Mark Pitcavage, An Equitable Burden: The De-
cline of the State Militias (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1995). 
38. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 228 (cited in note 15) (quoting Penn-
sylvania Convention, Declaration of Rights, August 21, 1776). 
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That would seem evidence enough that this right was not truly 
individual but carefully constrained by legal category. There was 
nothing unusual in this formulation by Pennsylvania; the right to 
possess firearms had always been subject to government regula-
tion under British common law and colonial practice. Pennsyl-
vania retained a long tradition of controlling dangerous popula-
tions, rejecting, as Cornell writes, "the very right to armed 
resistance posited by the Standard Model." 39 The framers of the 
United States Constitution drew upon the same legal heritage. 
Of course it is a very strange conception of America's 
founding document to believe that it included a right of armed 
rejection by any group of individuals. The Framers knew what 
horrors faced them if they could not establish social and political 
order. Shays' Rebellion was an obvious indicator to them of the 
direction of the country if they did not act quickly. George 
Washington wrote to Madison that "We are fast verging to anar-
chy and confusion," finding the crisis in Massachusetts but a lo-
cal variant of a national problem requiring a federal solution.40 
Most of the new nation's would-be leaders found the Shaysites 
dangerous levelers who could easily link up with other support-
ers of excessive democracy, unless, as Secretary of War Henry 
Knox recommended, federal troops were sent against them. 
Washington displayed more skepticism, attempting to learn if 
the rebels had "real grievances" and why the government of 
Massachusetts did not address these problems. But if the Shay-
sites lacked some substantive complaint against their govern-
ment, then Washington agreed with Knox that the states must 
move to defend their interests or witness the dissolution of gov-
ernment in the United States.41 
Framed in the aftermath of Shays' Rebellion, the Constitu-
tion appears to many scholars as an essentially conservative re-
action to the spread of democracy.42 Such a reading seems to me 
39. ld. at 229. 
40. Letter from Washington to Madison (Nov. 5, 1786), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 
29 The Writings of George Washington 29,51 (Government Printing Office, 1939). 
41. ld. at 26-28 (Letter from Washington to David Humphreys, Oct. 22, 1786); id. at 
33-35 (Letter from Washington to Henry Lee, Oct. 31, 1786); Letter from Knox to Con-
gress, (Oct. 18, 1786), in John Fitzpatrick, ed., 31 Journals of the Continental Congress 
887 (Government Printing Office, 1934); Letter from Knox to Washington {Oct. 23, 
1786), Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston). 
42. David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection 
127-34 (U. of Massachusetts Press, 1980); Stephen E. Patterson, The Federal Reaction to 
Shays's Rebellion, in Robert A. Gross, ed., In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial of an 
Agrarian Rebellion 101-18 (U. Press of Virginia, 1993); Michael Lienesch, Reinterpreting 
Rebellion: The Influence of Shays's Rebellion on American Political Thought, in Gross, 
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anachronistic. The Framers' first concern was to create a coun-
try which would survive; that goal, in their eyes, required certain 
limitations on personalliberty.43 Guns were to be used by those 
serving in the militia, as state laws made evident, and the mili-
tia's duty was to maintain order.44 Unlike during the American 
Revolution, when the crowd was the militia, in the early national 
period the crowd was repeatedly confronted by the militia.45 
Even Samuel Adams, one of America's leading democrats, re-
jected pardons for the Shaysites: "the man who dares to rebel 
against the laws of a republic ought to die. "46 Not a lot of sup-
port for the right of insurrection there. 
But what if the government acted in a tyrannical fashion? 
Surely the people should rise up in rebellion then? Yet that was 
the purpose of the Constitution, to prevent despotism. Similarly, 
the central government, Madison hoped, would act as a check on 
the excess power of the state governments, which he feared 
more than a federal tyranny.47 Revolution, as Cornell reminds us, 
ed., In Debt to Shays at 161-82; Richard D. Brown, Shays's Rebellion and the Ratification 
of the Federal Constitution in Massachusens, in Richard Beeman, et al., eds., Beyond 
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 113 (U. of 
North Carolina Press, 1987). 
43. Federalist 6 (Hamilton) at 53 (cited in note 16); Federalist 15 (Hamilton) at 105 
(cited in note 16); Federalist 70 (Hamilton) at 423 (cited in note 16); Federalist 10 (Madi-
son) at 77 (cited in note 16); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 
1787), in Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., 10 The Papers of James Madison 212-14 (U. of 
Chicago Press, 1977); Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Robert A. 
Rutland, et al., eds., 11 The Papers of James Madison 297-300 (U. Press of Virginia, 
1977). 
44. Oarence C. Ferguson, The Inherent Justiciability of the Constitutional Guaranty 
Against Domestic Violence, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 407 (1959). 
45. On Colonial and revolutionary traditions of crowd action see Pauline Maier, 
From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Op-
position to Britain, 1756-1776 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in 
Revolutionary Massachusens, 1765-1780 (Academic Press, 1977); Edward Countryman, A 
People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-
1790 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1981); Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws: 
Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier (U. Press 
of Virginia, 1993). On crowds in the constitutional period opposed by militia, see Wil-
liam Slade, ed., Vermont State Papers 475-82 (J.W. Copeland, 1823); Pennsylvania 
Packet, and Daily Adveniser, Dec. 27, 1786; Vermont Journal, and the Universal Adver-
tiser, Dec., 1783; Alan Taylor, Libeny Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary 
Senlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1990). On the 
crowd in the early national period facing militia, see Paul A. Gilje, The Road to Mo-
bocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (U. of North Carolina Press, 
1987), and David Grimsted, American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War (Oxford 
U. Press, 1998). 
46. John H. Lockwood, et al., eds., 1 Western Massachuseus: A History, 1636-1925 
at 183 (Lewis Historical Publishing Co., 1926). George Washington wrote Benjamin Lin-
coln, Jr., that the insurgents "had by their repeated outrages forfeited all right to Citizen-
ship." Fitzpatrick, ed., 29 Writings of Washington at 168 (cited in note 40). 
47. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the U. States, in Marvin Meyers, ed., 
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is a natural right, a last resort when the Constitution itself has 
been contravened; it is not itself a part of the Constitution.48 
Such an extension of violent opposition to authority as a regular 
component of government would have destabilized the nation 
from the beginning and guaranteed its failure. Fortunately the 
framers were smarter than that. 
It is very possible that we now live in a nation of individual-
ists intent on personal self-fulfillment unwilling to suffer any in-
convenience, such as any sort of limitation on our right to pur-
chase and possess firearms. But that does not mean it was 
always this way. One of the few ideas which one can locate per-
colating among both the Federalists and Antifederalists is the 
notion that liberty requires sacrifice, that the individual must be 
willin§ to give up some convenience in the name of the common 
good. 
In terms of gun ownership, sacrificing a little liberty for the 
public good meant allowing the government to conduct gun cen-
suses (a continuation of the traditional assize of arms), a willing-
ness to serve in the militia when called, placing one's own gun at 
the service of the state in times of emergency, and, for some, the 
denial of the right to bear arms.50 It certainly did not mean that 
the individual could get together with some other aggrieved 
neighbors and defy the law. Though the federal and state gov-
ernments rarely responded to such threats to social order with 
violence during the first fifty years of the republic, they did call 
out troops on a number of occasions when threatened with in-
surrection. And the insurgents rarely found friendly support 
elsewhere in the country. Even the most sympathetic study of 
the Whiskey Rebellion, that of Thomas Slaughter, cannot find 
much support for their goals outside of western Pennsylvania.51 
Even the most assiduous quotation hunter has yet to find a sin-
gle line insisting that the rebels are just exercising their Second 
Amendment rights. 
The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 59 (U. Press 
of New England, 1981); Letter from Madison to Washington (April 16, 1787), id. at 66-
69; Federalist 8 (Hamilton), at 66 (cited in note 16); Federalist 32 (Hamilton), at 197 
(cited in note 16); Federalist 43 (Madison), at 271 (cited in note 16); Federalist 45 (Madi-
son), at 288 (cited in note 16); Federalist 46 (Madison), at 294 (cited in note 16); Rakove, 
Original Meanings, at 34, 48-56, 334·36 (cited in note 16). 
48. Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism at 237-38 (cited in note 15). 
49. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 19,396-
429 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1969). 
SO. Bellesiles, Origins of American Gun Culture at 428-35 (cited in note 13). 
51. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American 
Revolution 190-204 (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
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In the long and meticulous debates over the Militia Act in 
the first Congress, which considered even the exact bore of the 
muskets to be required of the militia, the speakers return re-
peatedly to just how much authority the federal government 
should have in exercising its constitutional obligation of regu-
lating the militia. Several representatives noted that every in-
crease in federal power came at the expense of the states. Tho-
mas Fitzsimmons rejected the need for militia training as "a 
great tax on the community, productive of little instruction or 
edification, either in regard to military tactics, or the morals of a 
civilized nation."52 Most members, however, agreed with Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut that "the different states had certainly 
an inherent right to arm and protect the lives and property of the 
citizens." But that to "[m]ore effectively ... exercise this right" 
the states needed "to give up to the general government the 
power of fixing what arms the militia should use, by what disci-
pline they should be regulated," and various other forms of pre-
cisely ordering the nature of the militia. The only power left to 
the states in this formulation was "the right to say what descrip-
tions of persons should compose the militia, and to appoint the 
officers that were to command it."53 Joshua Seney of Maryland 
thought even this latter qualification was granting the states too 
much power, which they could easily abuse.54 
Perhaps the only way around these problems for the Stan-
dard Modelers, aside from conducting research, is to argue that 
an individual right must be understood to apply solely to those 
who enjoy all other rights. Thus the right to bear arms is indi-
vidual in that the militia consists of all adult male citizens (by 
definition white in most states), and so for them the right is indi-
vidual. But what happens when those citizens are divided? That 
was bound to happen often, as Madison perceived. The Consti-
tution, as we all know, was an effort to form a stable government 
between the dangers posed by the tyranny of the majority and 
excess factionalism. There was no consensus, no unity of vision. 
The Federalists were not in complete agreement; neither were 
the Antifederalists-nothing like it. If each collection of citizens 
was allowed to respond with arms in defense of their under-
standing of liberty, there would be no social peace. 
Not that social peace was always a good thing. It is worth 
52. William C. diGiacomantonio, et al., eds., 14 Documentary History of the First 
Federal Congress 1789-1791 at 56 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996). 
53. ld. at 84. 
54. ld. at 93-94. 
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remembering that several state governments were despotic in 
this period. Southern states viciously enforced a system of slav-
ery, denying the most basic rights to millions of Americans. 
They also trampled on the individual rights of whites, giving 
postmasters the right to open mail searching for anti-slavery sen-
timent, forbidding the circulation of literature questioning slav-
ery, outlawing public meetings of abolitionists, enforcing the 
most unrelenting intellectual conformity ever experienced in 
American history in gross violation of the Constitution. Did the 
Southern militia rise up to battle this tyranny? Of course not; 
they enforced it. 55 When the state of Georgia violated the rights 
of the Cherokee people and forced them off their lands in direct 
violation of the Supreme Court, did the militia of Georgia rush 
out, muskets in hand, to protect the rights of their fellow Ameri-
cans? Obviously not; they joined with the Army in expelling the 
Cherokee from their property. When workers had their right of 
assembly taken from them, where was the militia? When 
women were jailed for attempting to exercise the right to vote, 
where was the militia? One could go on and on. The reality of 
American history is clear: the militia and its National Guard suc-
cessor upholds the power of the state. The Standard Model op-
erated only once in American history: in 1861. 
Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the whole gun control 
debate is the way in which people who call themselves conserva-
tives support a right to armed insurrection.56 Logically, those 
who uphold this insurrectionist reading of the Second Amend-
ment should be endorsing armed uprisings by workers, racial 
minorities, Indians, the Klan, anarchists, and the whole goulash 
of American political dissidents who believe in armed response 
to political disagreement.57 They certainly should be condemn-
55. On the government protecting itself against such threats, see Federalist 21 
(Hamilton), at 138 (cited in note 16); Federalist 28 (Hamilton), at 178 (cited in note 16); 
Federalist 74 (Hamilton), at 447 (cited in note 16); St. George Tucker, 1 Blackstone's 
Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal 
Government of the United States 366-67 (W.Y. Birch and A. Small, 1803); Story, 2 Com· 
mentaries at 546-47, 559 (cited in note 20). That Madison in fact saw a threat from an 
excess of democratic action is evidenced in a letter he wrote his father, in which he stated 
that the Shaysites sought "an abolition of debts, public and private, and a new division of 
property." Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 28 (P. Smith, 1995). 
56. See for instance, L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 
38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1311 (1997); and the exchange between Dennis A. Henigan, 
Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 107 (1991), and Stephen 
P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming 
Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 131 (1991). 
57. David Williams evades this problem by declaring that the Second Amendment 
did indeed originally grant an insurrectionary right; but not now! Williams, The Militia 
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ing the police powers of the state which have crushed every 
armed insurrection from the Whiskey Rebellion through the 
Civil War to the Rodney King riots. But honestly, that is not 
what the "Standard Modelers" are arguing for. They are not 
radicals taking to the streets and endorsing the people's right to 
armed rebellion, whoever those people happen to be. They tend 
to be political conservatives seeking to negate the government's 
authority to regulate firearms. But these are conservatives who 
offer a libertarian reading of society; rather than relying on the 
state for personal protection, the individual must protect himself. 
It is a view which accepts and fosters the atomistic nature of so-
ciety and can conceive of no communal strategy for collective se-
curity. It is a view which would have baffled Madison, who 
sought social cohesion in a society which all too easily could 
fragment and collapse into chaos. And it is a perspective which 
carries a heavy and violent price tag. 
Recently, one of the leading voices in favor of the Standard 
Model, Sanford Levinson, joined J. M. Balkin in calling for legal 
scholars to get beyond "The Canons of Constitutional Law."58 
They argue that a reliance on the same materials generation af-
ter generation has stultified legal education and negatively influ-
ences the character of scholarly arguments through what they 
call "deep canonicity."59 This deep canonicity determines the na-
ture of "law-talk," the rhetoric of the law, as well as the issues 
which are appropriate for examination and the way in which 
they are studied; "those ideas so basic that th~ do not even ap-
pear on the 'radar screen' of the imagination." 
But most intriguing is Levinson and Balkin's notion of "Ca-
nonical Narratives." These narratives are "a set of stock stories 
about [the law], which are constantly retold and eventually take 
on a mythic status."61 It is hard to imagine a better description of 
the Standard Model's self-generation, especially the "canonical 
examples," the evidence offered time and again in support of the 
same positions.62 "These stories," Levinson and Balkin continue, 
"explain to the members of that society who they are and what 
values they hold most dear. These stock stories are both descrip-
Movement and the Second Amendment Revolution at 948-52 (cited in note 18). 
58. J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998). 
59. ld. at 985. 
60. ld. at 985. See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1991). 
61. Levinson and Balkin, Canons of Constitutional Law at 9'if7 (cited in note 58). 
62. ld. at 992. 
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tive and prescriptive"- for example, the mythology of "coura-
geous pioneers who won the West."63 
This call for the expansion of the canon is essentially a de-
mand for historical context.64 It is interesting therefore to note 
that Levinson offers a personal footnote that "there can be little 
doubt that many members of the founding generation viewed 
popular possession of arms as the ultimate 'check' on corrupt 
governments."65 That sounds like deep canonicity to me, par-
ticularly as he supports this assertion by citing his own article, 
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, which offers only three 
quotations supportive of this right, none by a contemporary of 
the first Congress.66 No doubt Levinson will enthusiastically wel-
come Saul Cornell's efforts in forging beyond the canon of the 
Standard Model to construct the historical context of the Second 
Amendment. 
Sometimes one gets the impression that some of the partici-
pants in this polemic do not even bother to read beyond the quo-
tations into the original sources. For instance, Standard Model-
ers trace the individual right to bear arms to Machiavel!'t's 
republicanism.67 Yet reading Machiavelli makes fairly clear that, 
to quote Wendy Brown, "Machiavelli's republican citizenry is 
not armed against the state but as the state-an armed citizenry 
is the state's heart, not its opposition or counterweight."68 
Even more telling is the comment of Stephen Holbrook that 
the framers of the Second Amendment intended "to guarantee 
the right of the people to have 'their private arms' to prevent 
63. ld. at 987. 
64. See particularly id. at 1021-24. 
65. ld. at 1013 n.157. 
66. Id. Levinson specifically cites pages 648-50 of The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment, where Story, Cooley, and Schroeder are cited in support of this right to in-
surrection. 
67. See, for instance, Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms at 8, 125 (cited in note 13). 
Malcolm does not actually quote or cite Machiavelli when discussing his ideas and influ-
ence. She does however quote J.G.A. Pocock's judgment that "(t)he rigorous equation 
of arms-bearing with civic capacity is one of Machiavelli's most enduring legacies to later 
political thinkers." Id. at 8 (quoting J.G.A. Pocock, The Political Works of James Har-
rington 18-19 (Cambridge U. Press, 1977)). Curiously, she does not quote or comment 
upon the immediately preceding sentences in which Pocock writes that Machiavelli in-
sisted that "an armed people" acted to "extend( ] her (the city-state's] power abroad" 
and were "subject to none but the public power." Id at 18. 
68. Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: 
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 661,662-63 
(1989). Among Niccolo Machiavelli's many writings on this point, see for instance The 
Prince 231 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1976}; History of florence and of the Affairs of Italy: From the 
Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent 180 (M.W. Dunne, 1901); Dis-
courses on the First Decade of Titus Livius 410 (1965). 
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tyranny and to overpower an abusive standing army or select 
militia."69 Yet consider the speech James Madison delivered 
when he introduced that same Second Amendment to the House 
of Representatives: 
In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard 
against the abuse in the executive department than any other; 
because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the 
weaker .... But I confess that I do conceive, that in a govern-
ment modified like this of the United States, the great danger 
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legisla-
tive body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be 
levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, 
namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of 
power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legis-
lative departments of government, but in the body of the peo-
ple, operating by the majority against the minority.70 
Madison hardly issued a clarion call for the people's right to in-
surrection. Perhaps we no longer agree with Madison's formula-
tion. Perhaps we find it elitist or poor prophesy. The point is: 
our opinion does not matter. This is still what Madison said. 
That is history; the rest is editorial. 
69. Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitu-
tional Right 77 (U. of New Mexico Press, 1984 ). 
70. Jack N. Rakove, ed., Declaring Rights: A Brief History with Documents 176-77 
(Bedford Books, 1998). 
